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Introduction
Key focus of the study
The primary challenge in the executive pay-performance relationship is finding a mutually 
beneficial balance between executive remuneration and organisational performance. This 
Orientation: The relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) remuneration and 
organisation performance has been a topic of close scrutiny, especially since the global financial 
crisis. Optimal contracting relies on the premise that effective incentives will link organisation 
financial performance and CEO remuneration in ways that will be in the best interests of both 
shareholders and CEOs.
Research purpose: The purpose of this research study was to investigate the relationship 
between CEO remuneration and organisation performance in South Africa between 2006 and 
2012 and to determine whether the two constructs were positively correlated.
Motivation for the study: The study provides an evidenced-based understanding of the nature 
of the CEO pay-performance relationship in South Africa. Understanding this relationship 
is critical to finding a suitable model to structure executive remuneration that will protect 
shareholders from over-remunerating executives in times of economic appreciation, whilst 
protecting executives from being underpaid in times of economic depreciation.
Method: The financial results and CEO remuneration of 21 of the top 40 listed companies 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange were analysed for the period 2006–2012. The research 
was a quantitative, archival study. The primary statistical techniques used in the study were 
correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis.
Main findings: The primary finding of the current research indicates that between 2006 and 
2012 organisation executives have noticeably been moving away from focusing on short-term 
incentives, which are categorised as performance-related elements of remuneration packages. 
Based on these findings, it is evident that the relationship between executive remuneration 
and organisational financial performance has been experiencing a decline, especially since 
the 2008 global financial crisis. The decline has predominantly been due to a move away 
from performance-related elements of remuneration contracts by CEOs, creating a disconnect 
between CEO remuneration and organisational performance. The findings suggest that, to 
a large extent, remuneration contracts for CEOs are no longer optimal for the organisation 
and its shareholders, but are influenced by the propensity of executives to enhance their 
own remuneration. There exists a link between short-term incentives received by CEOs and 
accounting-based organisational performance measures; on the other hand, fixed pay linked 
with organisational performance measures continue to be eroded as organisations’ executives 
become more innovative as they are noticeably moving away from focusing on short-term 
incentives.
Practical/managerial implications: A stronger test of the pay-performance link and the power 
of incentive design are required in order to ensure that executives are rewarded or penalised 
for poor performance. The question of how executives are paid also needs to be considered.
Contribution: This research contributes to the literature on CEO remuneration by providing 
an evidenced-based understanding of the nature of the CEO pay-performance relationship in 
South Africa. Understanding this relationship is critical to finding a suitable model to structure 
executive remuneration that will protect shareholders from over-remunerating executives in 
times of economic appreciation, whilst protecting executives from being underpaid in times 
of economic depreciation.
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challenge is compounded by the fact that there is no 
universally accepted understanding of the strength and 
significance of the relationship. In addition, the measurement 
of organisational performance is itself open to interpretation 
with a variety of conflicting indicators suggested as valid 
and reliable. The lack of clarity in the understanding and 
measurement of the constructs within the executive pay-
performance relationship makes the creation of a model to 
structure executive remuneration difficult. A longitudinal, 
evidence-based understanding of the relationship between 
executive pay and organisational performance is necessary 
to determine a meaningful and optimal model of executive 
remuneration.
Background to the study
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) assume the highest levels 
of responsibility and accountability for an organisation and 
its performance on behalf of the organisation’s shareholders 
(Kaplan, 2013; Wibowo & Kleiner, 2005). These individuals 
are typically highly skilled, have significant leadership 
competencies and are viewed as a scarce resource. As a 
result, these executives are highly incentivised through 
remuneration structures to remain in the employ of the 
organisation and drive the performance of the organisation. 
In order to ensure that there is alignment between the CEO’s 
interests and those of the shareholders it is important for 
shareholders to design and employ a pay-performance 
model that is proven to deliver this alignment.
There is a well-recognised challenge in finding a balance 
between remuneration that will be enticing enough to keep 
executives in the employ of the organisation without over-
compensating them when organisation performance is not 
favourable (Bebchuk & Fried, 2005; Marais & Lefifi, 2013). 
There have been calls from governments, trade unions 
and civil society to curb what is perceived as exorbitant 
executive remuneration in light of increasing levels of 
relative poverty and inequality, especially in countries 
like South Africa (Marais & Lefifi, 2013). The 2008 global 
financial crisis has placed executive remuneration even 
more directly in the spotlight due a perceived weak pay-
performance link.
According to researchers such as Shaw (2011) and Bebchuk, 
Cohen and Holger (2010), executive remuneration has been 
widely regarded as one of the key contributors to the financial 
crisis. This sentiment has found its way into academic 
literature as researchers try to understand more fully the root 
causes of the 2008 global financial crisis.
Much criticism has been levelled at organisations and 
their remuneration committees for increases in executive 
remuneration in the face of disappointing financial results 
(Lindqvist & Grunditz, 2004). The amount of legislation 
and regulation in dealing with executive remuneration 
has subsequently increased, supporting remuneration 
contracts that reward superior organisation performance 
(Morrissey, 2009).
Research purpose
In South Africa, the Companies Act (Act No. 71 of 2008) and 
King Code and Report on Governance in South Africa (King 
III; Institute of Directors Southern Africa, 2009) specify 
that there should be a positive correlation between CEO 
remuneration and organisation performance, and associated 
disclosure requirements have also increased (Institute 
of Directors Southern Africa, 2009). The purpose of this 
research is to investigate whether there is indeed a positive 
correlation or not between CEO remuneration and company 
performance, especially in the biggest companies listed on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.
Trends from the research literature
There are empirical findings that support both a relationship 
between CEO pay and organisational performance, as well 
as little or no relationship. In seminal pieces of research, 
Jensen and Murphy (1999) found that the correlation was 
small and that shareholders came off second best. In contrast 
to this, Firth, Fung and Rui (2006) and Merhebi, Pattenden, 
Swan and Zhou (2006) found that there was a significant 
positive correlation between CEO pay and most measures 
of organisational performance. Most studies show a decline 
in the relationship between CEO pay and organisational 
performance since the global financial crisis in 2008 (Shaw, 
2011; Van Blerck, 2012; Van Rooyen, Du Toit, Botha & 
Rothmann, 2010).
Research objectives
To facilitate an optimal contract between a CEO and 
shareholders, the incentives of the CEO need to be aligned 
with the interests of shareholders, thus creating value for 
both through the pay–performance relationship (O’Byrne & 
Gressle, 2013; Veliyath & Bishop, 1995). The purpose of this 
research study was to investigate the relationship between 
CEO remuneration and organisational performance in South 
Africa between 2006 and 2012, and to determine whether the 
two constructs were positively correlated.
The primary research objectives were as follows:
• To establish if there were any structural changes that 
occurred in South Africa after the 2008 global financial 
crisis with regard to the mix in the remuneration 
components received by CEOs.
• To establish the closest link (correlation) between 
CEO remuneration and financial performance of an 
organisation when considering the most commonly used 
financial performance measures.
The potential value-add of the study
This research contributes to the literature on CEO 
remuneration by providing an evidenced-based under-
standing of the nature of the CEO pay-performance 
relationship in South Africa. Understanding this relationship 
is critical to finding a suitable model to structure executive 
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remuneration that will protect shareholders from over-
remunerating executives in times of economic appreciation, 
whilst protecting executives from being underpaid in times 
of economic depreciation.
Previous research asserts that performance-based elements 
of CEO remuneration are necessary to justify the high 
remuneration packages of executives. The research points to 
the long-term dilemma that will arise for boards of directors 
if they become reluctant to either reward executives for 
superior performance or penalise them for poor performance.
What will follow
A more detailed review of the literature follows in the next 
section. The research design section outlines the longitudinal, 
quantitative, archival research method selected and describes 
the sampling rationale employed. The results of the study are 
then presented and discussed. The article concludes with a 
brief discussion of the research limitations and practical 
implications for remuneration practitioners.
Literature review
CEO remuneration components
CEO remuneration is composed of the financial compensation 
and other non-financial awards received by an executive 
from their firm for their service to the organisation. The 
concept of executive remuneration includes all payments 
made to executive members of the board including the CEO 
(Bussin, 2011). These payments include all guaranteed cost-
to-company (CTC), short-term and long-term incentives and 
other financial benefits for performance rendered (Bussin, 
2011). Desirable remuneration packages are created to ensure 
the ability of the company to attract and retain the best possible 
CEOs. The most common determinants for executive pay 
are organisation size, organisation performance, executive-
specific factors (such as age, experience, tenure, career path), 
organisation structure, job or position-specific factors and job 
complexity (Bussin, 2011).
Excessive pay can be seen as additional amounts of money 
that need to be paid for services and activities that were not 
originally planned or taken into account. Despite substantial 
heterogeneity in remuneration practices across different 
organisations, most CEO remuneration packages consist of 
salary, annual bonus, short-term and long-term performance 
incentives (Frydman & Jenter, 2010; Warr & Fay, 2001).
Ellig (2007) argues that the structure of an executive’s 
remuneration package will follow the path where it is 
the easiest for the executive to earn a more favourable 
remuneration. Should short-term incentives (STIs) be 
difficult to obtain due to factors outside the control of the 
CEO, the structure of the remuneration would lean towards 
a guaranteed CTC or fixed pay (FP). The inverse is also 
true, that should STIs be easier to obtain, the structure of 
remuneration will gravitate towards higher incentive pay 
(Ellig, 2007).
The principal-agent theory
The principal-agent theory needs to be understood in order to 
gain an understanding of the executive remuneration process. 
Laffont and Martimort (2002) argue that the owner of an 
organisation needs to delegate their responsibilities to other 
members of the organisation. The owner therefore becomes the 
principal and the employee becomes the agent. Duffhues and 
Kabir (2008) state that listed companies are characterised by the 
ownership of the organisation residing with the shareholders 
who reflect a diverse and wide cross-section of the population, 
whilst control is in the hands of a few managers responsible 
for the management of the organisation. The principal-agent 
theory infers that these managers or agents do not always 
perform their jobs solely in the best interests of the shareholders.
Frydman and Jenter (2010) discuss the structure of executive 
pay as a possible method of rectifying this misalignment 
between the principal and the agent. Compensation 
committees are one of the key mechanisms that could assist 
in aligning the principal and the agent by reviewing CEO 
compensation with specific attention to goal setting and 
alignment with incentives. O’Reilly and Main (2010) describe 
this process as the board crafting an optimal pay mechanism 
to try and align the interests of the CEO with those of the 
shareholders. Thus it is clear that the CEO is the agent of the 
shareholders, who as a group represent the principal and 
that the agent’s goals should be aligned with those of the 
organisation and the principal.
Remuneration committees
Organisations should appoint a remuneration committee 
or other such appropriate board committee, consisting 
entirely or mainly of independent non-executive directors, 
to make recommendations regarding executive and CEO 
pay. The principal-agent theory assumes it is the purpose 
of the board to monitor the CEO. However, O’Reilly and 
Main (2010) argue that this is a narrow view of the duties of 
a board. To minimise the costs associated with this theory, 
CEO compensation should be linked to both the CEO’s 
performance and the organisation’s performance to ensure an 
alignment between shareholders and management interests 
(O’Reilly & Main, 2010). Prior research showed that as the 
power of the CEO increased, their pay increased; however 
the sensitivity of their pay to performance decreased (Lin & 
Kuo, 2013; O’Reilly & Main, 2010).
King III (2009) discusses the remuneration committee 
in detail and adds that it should be the duty of the 
remuneration committee to assist the board in setting the 
various salary bands within the organisation, particularly 
for the remuneration packages of the senior executives. King 
III (2009) states that remuneration committees should keep 
the long-term goals of the organisation in mind when giving 
remuneration advice.
Optimal contracting and the managerial power approach
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) suggest that there are two 
contrasting views on the link between the agency problem and 
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the remuneration received by executives in an organisation. 
The optimal contracting approach, which considers executive 
remuneration as a remedy to the agency problem, is the 
more widely accepted view. Under the optimal contracting 
approach ‘boards are assumed to design compensation 
schemes to provide executives with efficient incentives to 
maximize shareholder value’ (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003, p. 1). 
This view is also supported by Shaw and Zhang (2010) as 
they assert that efficient remuneration contracts will link 
executive remuneration with organisational performance, 
whilst providing compelling incentives for executives to 
avoid self-serving activities and operate organisations in the 
shareholders’ best interests.
According to Bebchuk and Fried (2003), optimal remuneration 
contracts could result from either effective arm’s length 
bargaining between executives and boards of directors, or 
from market constraints that will encourage executives and 
boards of directors to adopt such contracts even in the absence 
of arm’s length bargaining. Market constraints consider what 
executives will ask boards of directors to approve and what 
boards of directors will agree to.
In contrast to the optimal contracting approach, the 
managerial power approach considers remuneration 
received by executives not only as a potential instrument for 
dealing with agency problems, but also as part of the agency 
problem (Frydman & Jenter, 2010). According to Bebchuk, 
Fried and Walker (2002), remuneration contracts are not only 
shaped by what would be optimal, but are also influenced by 
executives’ capability to influence their own remuneration 
contracts. Also, market constraints are not seen to play a 
significant role in preventing executives from obtaining 
arrangements that are more favourable to themselves.
According to the managerial power approach, board-
approved executive remuneration contracts often deviate 
from optimal contracting arrangements. Factors that enable 
this deviation include: boards of directors being subjected 
to influence by executives, boards being sympathetic to 
executives or boards being incompetent in overseeing 
remuneration contracts (Bebchuk et al., 2002). The result of 
managerial power is thus a situation in which executives 
receive rewards in excess of what would be optimal for 
shareholders. The excess rewards constitute rent extraction 
rather than the provision of efficient incentives (Bebchuk 
et al., 2002).
In summary, there are weaknesses in the optimal contracting 
approach that are highlighted by the managerial power 
approach. Despite these weaknesses, that the CEO exerts 
too much power over the negotiation of the remuneration 
package, it is still widely believed that executive rewards 
can be used to align the interests of executives to those of 
the shareholders and thereby reduce possible agency costs 
(Edmans & Gabaix, 2009). In addition, even if the CEO’s 
remuneration is efficient due to the optimal contracting 
approach, it does not preclude remuneration packages 
from being suboptimal and, as a result, intense scrutiny by 
shareholders remains important.
Organisation performance measures
Organisational performance can be measured in many 
different ways using accounting-based measures and 
market-based measures (Attaway, 2000). Fatemi, Desai and 
Katz (2003) argue that such measures do not account for the 
risk incurred by the organisation’s executive in their search 
for growth and profitability, suggesting two additional 
measures, namely economic value added (EVA) and market 
value added (MVA). According to the economic theories of 
remuneration, ‘organisational performance should affect an 
executive’s remuneration only to the extent that it serves as 
a proxy for unobservable managerial effort or productivity’ 
(Murphy, 1985, p. 20). Although previous theories uniformly 
suggest a relationship between compensation and observed 
performance, most analyses are not in agreement with regard 
to the measurement of organisational performance (Canarella 
& Gasparyan, 2008).
In the empirical compensation literature there seems to be 
limited consensus on the optimal measure of company 
performance as researchers have measured organisational 
performance in many different ways (Attaway, 2000; 
Bacidore, Boquist, Milbourn & Thakor, 1997; Canarella & 
Gasparyan, 2008; Carpenter & Sanders, 2002; Eriksson & 
Lausten, 2000; Fatemi et al., 2003; Kyriazis & Anastassis, 
2007). Measures of company performance can be divided 
into three main categories: absolute financial performance 
measures (audited measures within a specific year), financial 
performance ratios (ratios derived from absolute performance 
measures) and market performance measures (performance 
within equity markets) (Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik & Sannikov, 
2012; Shaw, 2011).
The CEO pay-performance relationship
Since the early 2000s executive compensation levels have 
increased dramatically. Managerial power and optimal 
contracting have been offered as leading reasons for this 
increase (Frydman & Jenter, 2010). Optimal contracting is 
defined as occurring when the three types of agency costs 
(contracting, monitoring and misbehaviour) are balanced 
against one another to minimise the total cost (Harvey, 
2012). It is suggested that executives have influenced 
remuneration committees to increase fixed pay (despite 
poor organisational performance over the financial crisis 
period) in order to compensate for the loss of short-
term and long-term incentive payouts (Amzaleg, Azar, 
Ben-Zion & Rosenfield, 2014; Frydman & Jenter, 2010). 
Through managerial power, CEOs are able to influence 
boards and compensation committees and thus influence 
the structure of their remuneration packages (Doscher & 
Friedl, 2010).
Jensen and Murphy (1999) acknowledge that there are 
serious problems with executive remuneration, but they 
do not view excessive CEO pay as the most significant 
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issue. They point out that ‘the relentless focus on how 
much CEOs are remunerated diverts public attention from 
the real problem – how CEOs are paid’ (Jensen & Murphy, 
1999, p. 64). Haynes, Thompson and Wright (2007) point 
out that failure to reward or punish executives for either 
superior or poor performance will erode the link between 
CEO remuneration and organisation performance and will, 
according to Jensen and Murphy (1999), entrench what they 
call ‘bureaucratic remuneration systems’ (p. 159). Instead, 
Anderson and Kleiner (2003) assert that the remuneration of 
organisations’ top executives should be virtually dependent 
on organisation performance.
Although the theoretical and empirical literature on 
executive remuneration is fairly well developed, it is far from 
complete, according to Canarella and Gasparyan (2008). A 
large number of pay-performance studies have been carried 
out in most parts of the world, and these studies reflect a lack 
of consensus on the pay-performance relationship (Abraham, 
Harris & Auerbach, 2014; Bruce, Buck & Main, 2005).
The literature indicates that there is limited consensus on the 
optimal measure of organisational financial performance as 
researchers continue to assess organisational performance 
in many different ways (Attaway, 2000; Bacidore et al., 1997; 
Chari, 2009; Fatemi et al., 2003). Older research studies use 
accounting and market-based measures of organisation 
performance, whilst more recent studies use EVA and MVA. 
Some researchers, like Canarella and Gasparyan (2008), use 
both accounting-based and stock market-based measures 
to avoid potential biases inherent in using either of the two 
performance measures on their own.
Firth et al. (2006) conducted a CEO pay-performance study 
in China. Their study, in which they used regression analysis 
techniques, found that there was a positive relation between 
CEO remuneration and organisation performance measured 
in both accounting and shareholder wealth. Their study 
results, however, indicate that the relations were only 
statistically significant under certain ownership conditions. 
Organisations that have state bureaucratic agencies as the 
major shareholder did not appear to embrace performance-
related pay schemes. Firth et al.’s regression results indicated 
that a change in shareholder wealth was positively associated 
with change in CEO remuneration and the relationship was 
not significant, that is, in the remuneration-performance 
equation, the change in shareholders’ wealth slope was 
0.004 for state-controlled organisations. In contrast, 
listed organisations with a private block-holder as the 
largest shareholder based CEO remuneration on changes 
in shareholder wealth, resulting in the remuneration-
performance equation with the change in shareholders’ 
wealth slope of 0.485.
In contrast to these and other studies which found a 
positive and significant relationship between CEO pay 
and organisation performance, Jensen and Murphy (1999) 
analysed the CEO remuneration of 2505 CEOs in 1400 
publicly held organisations from 1974 to 1988 in the US. 
They concluded that the relationship between CEO and 
shareholder wealth was small and had fallen significantly 
in the last 50 years. Mueller’s (2006) study supports this 
observation by concluding that executive remuneration 
packages in the US increased by far more than could be 
accounted for by increases in managerial productivity in 
the 1990s. The study by Mueller (2006) indicated that using 
the organisational remuneration-performance relationship 
derived from 1993 data, CEO remunerations were 215% 
higher than predicted by the 1993 estimates.
Another study, conducted in the UK by Haynes et al. (2007), 
found that organisation size had a positive and significant 
impact on executive remuneration (in the remuneration-
performance equation the slope on organisation size was 
found to be 0.21) and that the responsiveness of executive 
remuneration to organisation performance was much 
smaller when compared to the size of the organisation (the 
slope on organisation performance was found to be 0.12). A 
study by Duffhues and Kabir (2008) found no evidence of a 
positive pay-performance relationship for executives in the 
Netherlands, which led to the conclusion that executives 
in the Netherlands received rewards for reasons unrelated 
to performance. Duffhues and Kabir’s study found that 
in the pay-performance equation, the regression slope 
on organisation performance between 1998 and 2001 was 
between -0.539 and -0.074, whilst the slope for organisation 
size between 1998 and 2001 was between 0.399 and 0.413.
In South Africa, a CEO pay-performance research study by 
Shaw (2011) looked at financial service organisations during 
the period 2005 to 2010. Shaw categorised organisation 
performance measures into three main categories: absolute 
financial performance measures, financial performance ratios 
and market performance measures. The study used economic 
profit, accounting profit and shareholder returns in the form of 
return on equity (ROE) and headline earnings per share (HEPS) 
as measures of organisational performance. Debt to assets ratio 
and total assets or book value were also included to ensure 
comprehensive measurement of organisational performance.
Shaw (2011) found a moderate to strong relationship 
between CEO remuneration and organisation performance. 
However, the results of the study indicated that there has 
been a decline in the relationship between 2008 and 2012: the 
average coefficient of correlation scores between organisation 
performance and book value, earnings before income tax 
depreciation and appreciation (EBITDA) and profit after tax 
were found to be 0.56, 0.52 and 0.45, respectively. The results 
of the study also showed an associated structural change in 
the mix of remuneration components, ‘most notably there 
was an observed shift in CEO remuneration from variable 
pay to fixed pay’ (Shaw, 2011, p. 102).
A similar study on South African financial institutions 
conducted by Van Blerck (2012) used EVA, ROE and 
share price as the organisation performance measures and 
considered a time period between 2002 and 2011. Van Blerck’s 
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findings support those of Shaw (2011), finding a moderate 
correlation between share price and executive remuneration 
and only a weak relationship with ROE before 2007. Shaw’s 
study found an average coefficient of correlation of 0.013 
between remuneration and ROE, whilst Van Blerck found it to 
be 0.293. Van Blerck found that the remuneration received by 
executives in South African financial institutions correlated 
strongly with EVA and that the correlation strengthened after 
the 2008 financial crisis: the coefficient of correlation for EVA 
between 2002 and 2006 was found to be 0.592 and between 
2007 and 2011 it found to be 0.663. More importantly, Van 
Blerck also found that executives based in the US have 
rewards that are strongly aligned to equity-based incentives 
compared to South African executives, whose rewards are 
strongly aligned to EVA: the coefficient of correlation for ROE 
between 2002 and 2006 was found to be 0.067 and between 
2007 and 2011 it found to have increased to 0.338.
Conceptual underpinning of CEO pay-performance 
relationship
Whilst CEOs are responsible and accountable for their 
respective organisations’ performance, and are highly 
incentivised through remuneration structures to ensure 
they perform their duties solely in the best interest of the 
shareholders, in recent years CEOs’ remunerations have been 
in the limelight and often for the wrong reasons (Anderson & 
Kleiner, 2003; Enrione, Mazza & Zerboni, 2006; Matsumura & 
Shin, 2005; Ozkan, 2011). In view of many national recessions 
caused by the financial crisis of 2008, the high remuneration 
packages of executives, especially CEOs, has attracted the 
attention of the public, unions, investors, the media and 
academic researchers.
The public continues on the perception that executives 
receive excessive salaries and bonuses (Leon, 2012). The 
unions continue to express outrage at large remuneration 
increases in executives’ salaries compared to national 
average salaries of employees (Mantshantsha, 2007). The 
investors expect that there should be a close alignment 
between executives’ remunerations and performance of their 
respective organisations (Sharp, Mackay, Rankin & Aling, 
2012). The unions, investors and the media seize on any 
executive’s remuneration that appears excessive, particularly 
if recent performance of the organisation is regarded as poor 
(Perry & Zenner, 2001).
The academic researchers continue to focus on establishing 
the relationship between executives’ remunerations and 
organisation performance. The remuneration of organisations’ 
top executives should be virtually dependent on organisation 
performance and organisations that evaluate their CEOs will 
be successful overall even though the evaluation process is 
time consuming (Anderson & Kleiner, 2003). The relation 
between executive remuneration, especially that of CEOs, 
and organisations’ performance is still an important issue 
in financial debate (Traichal, Gallinger & Johnson, 1999). 
According to Jensen and Murphy (1999), the executive 
remuneration literature has grown considerably over the last 
50 years. Although the theoretical and empirical literature on 
executive compensation is fairly well developed, it is far from 
complete, according to Canarella and Gasparyan (2008).
The literature reviewed indicates that research on executive 
pay-performance, especially for CEOs, has yielded mixed 
and inconclusive results due to the principal-agent problem 
and managerial power approach. According to the agency 
framework, executive remuneration is an efficient means 
of aligning executive interests more closely with those of 
shareholders through a remuneration contract that rewards 
superior company performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
literature also indicates that innovation is needed to establish 
sound remuneration policies that are aligned with the long-
term strategic plans of organisations. Corporate governance 
mechanisms are also utilised to ensure that the interests of both 
the principal and agent are aligned. According to McKnight 
and Weir (2009), corporate governance mechanisms are used 
to ‘realign the interests of agents and principals and so reduce 
agency costs’ (p. 140). The above discussions have identified 
two key points: firstly, executive remunerations should have a 
strong incentive effect and thus be related to performance and, 
secondly, due to potential conflicts of interest, safeguarding 
the objectivity of the remunerating process is crucial.
The corporate governance and disclosure requirements 
that are currently applicable in South Africa through the 
implementation of the Companies Act (2008) and King III 
(Institute of Directors Southern Africa, 2009) has given a 
clear indication that there is a need to ensure that executive 
remunerations are linked to their respective organisational 
performances. It is these regulatory changes and the current 
economic climate that make this research relevant. There is 
a need to link reward and performance, a powerful lever for 
driving business strategy.
Research design
Research approach
This research study was an empirical exploratory quantitative 
study that was aimed at assessing the relationship between 
CEO total remuneration and the financial performance of an 
organisation as this approach was the best way to answer 
the research questions. The total remuneration consisted of 
FP (including benefits) and STIs (these incentives measure 
performance for up to 1 year and typically include profit 
share, commission and bonus schemes).
The research took the form of a desktop study and was 
archival in nature, using secondary sources to provide 
the organisation financials and their respective executive 
remuneration data for CEOs. The research approach was 
ex-post facto in nature in that the focus was on reporting the 
characteristics of the variables rather than playing any role in 
manipulating them (Saunders & Lewis, 2012).
The research was also longitudinal in nature, allowing for 
the identification of trends and the isolation of any unusual 
observations either in the events or the data.
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Research method
Research participants
The research data utilised were obtained for publicly listed 
organisations on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). 
According to the JSE listing requirements, listed organisations 
are contractually bound to adopt King III and the Companies 
Act of 2008 (Institute of Directors Southern Africa, 2009) and, 
as a result, these organisations were required to disclose the 
information needed for the research. The information used 
was deemed credible as it had been subject to financial audits 
that are stipulated by the JSE Securities Exchange rules.
The research data was drawn from the McGregor BFA 
database. McGregor BFA is South Africa’s provider of 
financial data feeds and analysis tools and covers the JSE 
and global share prices as well as organisation information 
including annual reports and financial statements.
The research utilised publicly listed organisations on the 
JSE for the time period 2006–2012. The combined number of 
organisations listed on the JSE is 472 (JSE, 2009). The JSE top 40 
organisations have a combined market capitalisation (MC) of 
83.69% of the total JSE MC of all the 472 organisations on the 
JSE as of 25 April 2013 (Satrix, 2013). As a result, these JSE top 40 
organisations were chosen as the research population as they 
represent a significant quantity of the total JSE. The proportion 
of the total capitalisation of the JSE top 40 organisations was 
seen as being large enough to be sufficient for the research. 
The same scoping process is consistent with that of previous 
research on executive remuneration done by Miller (1995).
The list of organisations on the JSE top 40 changes from year 
to year as a result of some organisations being replaced by 
organisations with growing MC effectively moving ‘up the 
list’. The resulting number of organisations on the JSE top 40 
between 2006 and 2012 was 57 in total. These 57 organisations 
were subjected to the following criteria for inclusion in the 
sample:
• The organisation had to have been on the JSE top 40 for 
the entire research period (2006–2012); this reduced the 
number of organisations to 27.
• The secondary research data required for the current 
research had to be available either from the McGregor 
BFA database or financial statements of the respective 
organisation; this reduced the number of organisations to 22.
• More than one organisation with the same executive 
receiving the same remuneration was considered as one 
organisation and the different organisation performance 
measures were added; this reduced the number of 
organisations to 21.
Table 1 contains the list of organisations included in the 
research sample.
Measuring instruments
Total remuneration was defined to include FP, the 
combination of the basic salary and benefits (car benefit, 
other benefits and cost of employee benefits) received during 
the organisation’s financial year, and STIs (these incentives 
measure performance for up to 1 year, and typically include 
profit share, commission and bonus schemes) (21st Century 
Pay Solutions, 2010). Executive remuneration figures that 
were either in Great British Pound (GBP), United States 
Dollar (USD) or Euro (EUR), and not in South African 
Rand (ZAR), were converted to ZAR utilising the average 
exchange rates between 2006 and 2012: GBP/ZAR exchange 
rate used was 13.08, USD/ZAR was 7.74 and EUR/ZAR 
was 10.47.
Ideally, long-term incentives (LTIs) should be included in 
studies with the objective of determining the relationship 
between CEO remuneration and the financial performance of an 
organisation (Lippert & Porter, 1997; Murphy, 1985). However, 
the measurement of LTIs has been proven problematic, 
uncertain and only based on future performance targets 
at the time total remuneration is awarded. It has therefore 
become accepted practice to include only FP and STIs in pay-
performance analyses (Core, Holthausen & Larcker, 1999).
The second unit of analysis was the financial performance 
of the organisations. For the purposes of this research, and 
largely based on past research work on pay-performance 
sensitivity, the following organisation financial performance 
measures were chosen (their definitions are sourced from 
McGregor BFA and Ward & Price, 2006):
• Market capitalisation (MC): The total value of the issued 
shares of a publicly traded organisation. This figure 
is used to determine an organisation’s size. The unit 
of measurements for MC is usually the currency of the 
country, in this case ZAR:
Market capitalisation = Issued Shares × Market Price [Eqn 1]
TABLE 1: List of organisations included in the research sample.
Number Organisation Industry
1 ABSA Group Ltd Financials
2 Anglo American Platinum Ltd Basic materials
3 Anglo American PLC Basic materials
4 BHP Billiton PLC Basic materials
5 Exxaro Resources Ltd Basic materials
6 FirstRand Ltd Financials
7 Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd Basic materials
8 Intu Properties PLC Financials
9 Investec PLC Financials
10 Kumba Iron Ore Ltd Basic materials
11 MTN Group Ltd Telecommunications
12 Naspers Ltd Consumer Services
13 Nedbank Group Ltd Financials
14 Old Mutual PLC Financials
15 Remgro Ltd Industrials
16 RMB Holdings Ltd Financials
17 SABMiller PLC Consumer goods
18 Sanlam Ltd Financials
19 Sasol Ltd Oil and gas
20 Standard Bank Group Ltd Financials
21 Tiger Brands Ltd Consumer goods
Note: listed alphabetically.
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• Earnings per share (EPS): The portion of an organisation’s 
profit allocated to each outstanding share of common 
stock; it serves as an indicator of an organisation’s 
profitability. The unit of measurements for EPS was 
South African Cents:
EPS Net Income DividendsOn eferredStock
Average Outs ding S
=
− Pr
tan hares
 [Eqn 2]
• Return on Equity (ROE): The amount of net income 
returned as a percentage of shareholders equity. It is 
a ratio that measures an organisation’s efficiency in 
generating profit for each unit of shareholders’ equity. 
ROE measures an organisation’s profitability by 
revealing how much profit an organisation generates 
with the money shareholders have invested. The unit of 
measurements for ROE was a percentage:
ROE Net Income
ShareholderEquity
=  [Eqn 3]
• Economic value added (EVA): A measure of an 
organisation’s financial performance based on the 
residual wealth calculated by deducting cost of capital 
from its operating profit (adjusted for taxes on a cash 
basis). The unit of measurements for EVA was ZAR:
EVA =
Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT)
Capital Employed (CE)
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)
 [Eqn 4]
• Market value added (MVA): It was found that it is 
essential to analyse MVA by placing all organisations on a 
uniform basis. There are different approaches to establish 
this and the one chosen for this research was to express 
the MVA performance indicator as a ratio as opposed to 
the difference based on the general definition for MVA. 
The approach effectively standardises all the enterprises 
to have the same size and further facilitates comparisons 
between large and small organisations. However, the 
use of a ratio eliminates the contribution of size to value 
creation:
MVA MarketValue
TotalCapital
=  [Eqn 5]
Research procedure
The relationship between CEO remuneration and measures 
of organisation performance were observed over a period 
of 7 years between 2006 and 2012. The time period included 
the recessionary decline phase due to the 2008 global 
financial crisis and the August 2011 stock market fall (Jensen 
& Murphy, 1999). The approach was chosen to ensure the 
validity of the research and also to ensure that the history 
for a given organisation would yield a maximum of seven 
observations. The 7-year period was also deemed sufficient 
to ensure limited influence of short-term irregularities, 
whilst being short enough to provide reliable estimates of the 
research constructs.
Statistical analysis
Correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis were 
used to determine two measures of the strength of the 
pay-performance relationship, namely the coefficient of 
correlation and the coefficient of determination respectively.
Results
Descriptive statistics
CEO remuneration: Fixed and variable pay
Table 2 contains a summary of the descriptive statistics for FP 
received by CEOs between 2006 and 2012.
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the descriptive 
statistics for CEO FP. Although the general trajectory of the 
average FP shows an upward trend, this increase slowed down 
during the recession period between 2008 and 2009. The FP 
mean and median plots in Figure 1 can both be approximated 
by linear equations with the coefficient of determination (R2) 
equal to 0.9212 (p = 0.0006100 < 0.10 and R = 0.9598) and 0.9548 
(p = 0.0001498 < 0.10 and R = 0.9771), respectively.
Table 3 contains a summary of the descriptive statistics for 
STIs received by CEOs between 2006 and 2012.
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the descriptive 
statistics for CEO STIs. There was no general trajectory 
observed for the average (mean) STIs between 2006 and 2012. 
On the contrary, it was observed that the median STIs had 
a downwards moving trajectory which was approximated 
by a linear equation with the coefficient of determination 
(R2) equal to 0.6491 (p = 0.02872 < 0.10 and R = 0.8056). For 
a linear approximation of the STI mean, the coefficient of 
determination was found to be equal to 0.02797 (p = 0.7200 > 
0.1, indicating statistical insignificance as the null hypothesis, 
which states that the slope of the linear approximation 
is equal to zero and has no effect, could not be rejected 
and R = 0.1672). For an approximation equation with the 
coefficient of determination (R2) greater than that found 
for the median (R2 = 0.6491), the STI mean approximation 
equation was found to be of the fourth degree with the 
coefficient of determination (R2) being 0.9972.
Organisation performance measures
Figure 3 shows the MC of the research sample, the combined 
JSE MC and the research sample percentage portion of the 
JSE between 2006 and 2012.
TABLE 2: CEO fixed pay summary (R ’000).
Year Mean Standard deviation Minimum Median Maximum
2006 6655 4759 2153 5118 18 612
2007 7861 6265 2353 5774 25 694
2008 8102 5800 2211 6153 21 392
2009 7996 5107 2433 6368 21 701
2010 8821 5752 2637 6558 22 104
2011 9095 5662 2957 6913 23 590
2012 9814 6244 1359 7698 24 697
n = 21.
http://www.sajhrm.co.za doi:10.4102/sajhrm.v13i1.668
Page 9 of 18 Original Research
Despite the fact that only the 21 organisations of the JSE top 40 
have been included in the research sample, these organisations, 
as illustrated in Figure 3, had a combined MC of between 50% 
and 82% of the total JSE MC for the research period between 
2006 and 2012. The average percentage MC representation of the 
research sample to the JSE MC for the research period was 68%.
Table 4 contains a summary of the means of the descriptive 
statistics for organisation performance measures selected for 
the research study: MC, EPS, ROE, EVA and MVA.
Table 5 contains a summary of the standard deviations for 
the organisation performance measures.
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FIGURE 1: Graphical representation of the descriptive statistics for CEO fixed pay.
TABLE 3: CEO short-term incentives summary (R ’000).
Year Mean Standard deviation Minimum Median Maximum
2006 8381 7906 0 6500 31 797
2007 10 182 9399 0 8498 39 881
2008 7473 8982 0 5243 37 920
2009 6527 5821 0 4770 22 154
2010 8160 8087 0 4583 29 421
2011 10 357 12 470 0 4918 45 095
2012 6953 7324 0 3400 22 059
n = 21.
y = –162.8x4 + 2541.1x3 – 13263x2 + 26138x – 6852.1
R2 = 0.9972
y = -611.43x + 7861.7
R2 = 0.6491
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FIGURE 2: Graphical representation of the descriptive statistics for CEO short-term incentives.
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Results of the effects of the 2008 financial crisis
The primary objective of this research was to determine the 
relationship between CEO remuneration and the financial 
performance of an organisation. As a result, the first research 
question investigated whether any structural changes occurred 
with regard to the mix of remuneration components CEOs 
received after the 2008 financial crisis. Figure 4 shows year-
on-year percentage changes in CEO total remuneration (FP 
and STI) between 2006 and 2012. Also included in Figure 4 are 
the respective initial FP and STI averages (i.e. for ZAR-based 
figures; non-ZAR-based figures and the total research sample) 
for 2006.
Figure 4 shows that the percentage year-on-year change 
trajectories for CEO FP listed in ZAR and other currencies 
were observed to be similar, except in 2012 when the two 
were going in opposite directions. As for CEO STIs, the 
trajectories were observed to be similar except for 2011, when 
the CEO STIs listed in ZAR spiked whilst those listed in other 
currencies slowed down.
Figure 5 shows the calculated STI:FP ratios for means and 
medians between 2006 and 2012 with their respective trend 
lines. The trend lines indicate that there was a change in 
the mix in FP and STIs and that the change was statistically 
significant: R2 mean = 0.4534 (p = 0.09732 < 0.10 and 
R = 0.6733) and R2 median = 0.7876 (p = 0.007677 < 0.10 and 
R = 0.8874).
Figure 6 shows the mean percentage mix between FP and 
STI as a percentage of total remuneration received by CEOs. 
It is evident that FP increased from 44% in 2006 to 59% in 
2012 and, in conjunction with Figure 4, indicates a trend of 
increasing FP compared to decreasing STIs.
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TABLE 4: Organisational performance measures means.
Year Market capitalisation (ZAR) Earnings per share (c) Return on investment (%) Economic value added (R ’000) Market value added
2006 126 127 302 078 411 872 45.41 -96 040 059 2.68
2007 152 428 562 410 372 635 27.22 -55 045 568 2.92
2008 105 504 699 867 408 180 20.07 8 437 130 1.92
2009 143 840 910 288 277 988 21.37 -74 430 824 1.99
2010 161 080 579 054 351 671 19.95 -49 226 725 2.07
2011 158 206 364 568 436 858 23.08 4 623 051 1.98
2012 189 816 637 829 257 915 16.91 -50 811 025 2.03
n = 21.
TABLE 5: Organisational performance measures standard deviations.
Year Market capitalisation (ZAR) Earnings per share (c) Return on investment (%) Economic value added (R ’000) Market value added
2006 117 876 561 428 918 429 56.88 486 081 146 2.00
2007 147 782 173 297 871 015 23.38 360 619 615 2.90
2008 101 376 853 276 929 707 39.34 214 398 037 1.11
2009 138 000 304 554 648 033 30.31 338 667 551 1.60
2010 151 136 297 119 915 648 19.79 383 469 055 1.34
2011 141 199 051 489 1 155 145 22.68 228 620 487 1.37
2012 173 261 507 601 552 202 17.97 427 188 317 1.53
n = 21.
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Results of the correlation between CEO remuneration and 
organisation performance
Figure 7 shows the coefficient of correlation (R) results for the 
correlation analysis that was done with FP as a dependant 
variable; independent variables considered for the correlation 
analysis included all the organisational financial performance 
measures selected for the research and are as listed on the 
horizontal axis of Figure 7. Figure 7 also includes the 7 years’ 
correlation results averages for each of the organisation 
financial performance measures and a table with all the 
correlation coefficient (R) numerical values. For example, the 
correlation coefficient between FP (dependent variable) and 
MC (independent variable) in 2006 on Figure 7 was found to 
be 0.7709, whilst that between FP (dependent variable) and 
MVA (independent variable) in 2006 on Figure 7 was -0.2619. 
Table 6 contains similar coefficient of correlation (R) results 
n = 21.
FIGURE 4: CEO fixed pay (a) and short-term incentive (b) means and percentage changes.
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to those found in Figure 7 and their associated p-values as 
determined using the Pearson product moment correlation 
coefficient method.
Figure 8 shows the correlation coefficient results for the 
correlation analysis that was done with STI means as the 
dependant variable; independent variables are as listed on 
the horizontal axis and include all the selected organisation 
financial performance measures. Figure 8 also includes 
the 7 years’ correlation results averages. Table 7 contains 
similar coefficient of correlation (R) results to those found 
in Figure 8 and their associated p-values as determined 
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FIGURE 6: Fixed pay – short term incentive mix (2006–2012).
Market Capitalisation EPS ROE EVA MVA
Average 0.7875 0.6838 -0.1570 -0.0240 -0.2631
2006 0.7709 0.4580 -0.2607 -0.2224 -0.2619
2007 0.8586 0.8462 -0.0795 0.0104 -0.2049
2008 0.6171 0.6120 -0.1426 -0.0332 -0.2193
2009 0.7973 0.6145 -0.1830 -0.2922 -0.3106
2010 0.8226 0.7176 -0.1760 -0.0208 -0.2985
2011 0.8328 0.6571 -0.1558 0.3445 -0.2810
2012 0.8128 0.8815 -0.1015 0.0457 -0.2655
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FIGURE 7: Correlation analysis: Fixed pay and organisational performance measures.
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using the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient 
method.
Due to the extreme relative nature of outliers, especially 
for STIs paid to CEOs by organisations, the medians for 
CEOs remuneration were also considered in the correlation 
analysis. Medians are not influenced by outliers compared 
to means and in most cases when data sets have outliers, 
reporting the median as the central tendency of the data 
often gives a better ‘typical’ data value than the mean 
(Anderson, Sweeney, Williams, Freeman & Shoesmith, 2007; 
Weiers, 2010).
Figure 9 shows the correlation results when the means 
and medians of the CEO remuneration and organisation 
performance measures were considered, with the FP and 
STIs as the two separately considered dependent variables.
Figure 10 shows the correlation coefficients absolute value 
differences in the results found in Figure 9 between the 
means and medians of the two dependent variables (i.e. FP 
or STI).
Figure 10 illustrates that the observed absolute value 
differences in the coefficients of correlation between FP 
means and FP medians when used as the dependent variable 
are between 0.01 and 0.29. In contrast, the observed absolute 
differences in the correlation coefficient between STI means 
and medians when used as the dependent variable are 
between 0.25 and 0.60. This illustrates that the absolute 
TABLE 6: Correlation analysis: Fixed pay and organisational performance measures.
Year Market capitalisation Earnings per share Return on investment Economic value added Market value added
ZAR p-value ZAR p-value ZAR p-value ZAR p-value ZAR p-value
2006 0.7709 4.310E-05 0.4580 0.0368 -0.2607 0.2538 -0.2224 0.3325 -0.2619 0.2514
2007 0.8586 6.336E-07 0.8462 0.0000 -0.0795 0.7319 0.0104 0.9644 -0.2049 0.3729
2008 0.6171 2.883E-03 0.6120 0.0032 -0.1426 0.5374 -0.0332 0.8863 -0.2193 0.3396
2009 0.7973 1.507E-05 0.6145 0.0030 -0.1830 0.4271 -0.2922 0.1987 -0.3106 0.1706
2010 0.8226 4.721E-06 0.7176 0.0002 -0.1760 0.4454 -0.0208 0.9286 -0.2985 0.1887
2011 0.8328 2.804E-06 0.6571 0.0012 -0.1558 0.5002 0.3445 0.1262 -0.2810 0.2172
2012 0.8128 7.534E-06 0.8815 0.0000 -0.1015 0.6616 0.0457 0.8439 -0.2655 0.2448
n = 21.
Market Capitalisaon EPS ROE EVA MVA
Average 0.3342 0.3202 -0.1656 -0.0095 -0.2253
2006 0.4047 0.5530 -0.1180 0.1165 -0.3519
2007 0.3533 0.5979 -0.1407 0.0704 -0.2581
2008 0.2452 0.2493 -0.0049 0.1925 -0.1856
2009 0.1800 0.1959 -0.3460 -0.1660 -0.3202
2010 0.3484 0.2421 -0.2113 -0.0704 -0.1859
2011 0.4202 0.2317 -0.1428 0.0505 -0.0751
2012 0.3878 0.1714 -0.1953 -0.2598 -0.2003
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FIGURE 8: Correlation analysis: Short-term incentives and organisational performance measures.
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differences between means and medians are higher for STIs 
as compared to FP.
Discussion
The primary objective of this research study was to 
investigate the relationship between CEO remuneration 
and organisation performance in South Africa between 
2006 and 2012 and to determine whether the two 
constructs were positively correlated. Understanding 
this relationship is critical to finding a suitable model 
to structure executive remuneration that will protect 
shareholders from  over-remunerating executives in times 
of economic appreciation, whilst protecting executives 
from being underpaid in times of economic depreciation.
The first research question investigated was whether there 
were any structural changes to the total remuneration 
received by CEOs as a result of the global financial crisis. 
The implementation of the Companies Act (2008) and King 
III (2009) were expected to cause some form of structural 
changes in remuneration, more specifically, and in the context 
of the current research, to ensure that there is a link between 
executive remuneration and organisation performance.
TABLE 7: Correlation analysis: Fixed pay and short-term incentives.
Year Market capitalisation Earnings per share Return on investment Economic value added Market value added
ZAR p-value ZAR p-value ZAR p-value ZAR p-value ZAR p-value
2006 0.4047 0.0688 0.5530 0.0093 -0.1180 0.6106 0.1165 0.6150 -0.3519 0.1177
2007 0.3533 0.1162 0.5979 0.0042 -0.1407 0.5429 0.0704 0.7616 -0.2581 0.2587
2008 0.2452 0.2841 0.2493 0.2757 -0.0049 0.9830 0.1925 0.4032 -0.1856 0.4204
2009 0.1800 0.4350 0.1959 0.3947 -0.3460 0.1244 -0.1660 0.4720 -0.3202 0.1571
2010 0.3484 0.1217 0.2421 0.2904 -0.2113 0.3578 -0.0704 0.7618 -0.1859 0.4197
2011 0.4202 0.0579 0.2317 0.3122 -0.1428 0.5370 0.0505 0.8280 -0.0751 0.7463
2012 0.3878 0.0824 0.1714 0.4575 -0.1953 0.3963 -0.2598 0.2554 -0.2003 0.3839
n = 21.
Market Capitalisaon EPS ROE EVA MVA
FP Means 0.74 -0.41 -0.83 0.49 -0.62
FP Median 0.73 0.12 -0.85 -0.64 -0.55
STI Means 0.05 0.70 0.28 0.28 0.50
STI Median -0.52 0.10 0.71 0.62 0.75
Weak (+) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Moderate (+) 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Strong (+) 1 1 1 1 1
Weak (–) -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Moderate (–) -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
Strong (–) -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
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FIGURE 9: Correlation coefficients results: Means and medians.
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The research findings strongly suggest that some structural 
changes to the total remuneration of CEOs occurred after 2008. 
The main structural change was an increase in FP accompanied 
by a decrease in STIs. These findings can be supported further 
by the calculated means and medians of the STI to FP ratios. 
The trend lines for the means and medians show that there 
was an upward movement between 2006 and 2007, which 
was followed by a downward movement in 2008. The general 
regression equations for the STI:FP ratios have the following 
negative slopes: βmean = -0.0701 (R
2
mean = 0.4534, p = 0.09732 < 
0.10) and βmedian = -0.1477 (R
2
median = 0.7876, p = 0.007677 < 0.10).
It can be seen that CEOs are becoming more innovative as 
they are noticeably moving away from focusing on STIs, 
which are categorised as performance-related elements of 
remuneration. As a result, CEOs are focusing more on FP 
rather than STIs. This change in focus results in the Companies 
Act (2008) and King III (2009) requirements being less 
effective, as CEOs avoid being measured for performance. 
As Jensen and Murphy (1999, p. 64) state, ‘the relentless 
focus on how much CEOs are remunerated diverts public 
attention from the real problem – how CEOs are paid’. Whilst 
the implementation of the Companies Act (2008) and King 
III (2009) was expected to cause structural changes driving 
the link between executive remuneration and organisation 
performance, the opposite has been observed.
The second research question was aimed at determining the 
correlation between CEO total remuneration and organisation 
performance. Corporate governance and economic theories 
of remuneration largely suggest that ‘organisational 
performance should affect an executive’s remuneration 
to the extent that it serves as a proxy for unobservable 
managerial effort or productivity’ (Murphy, 1985, p. 20). The 
expected pay-performance relationship was that a direct and 
strong relationship would be found to exist between CEO 
remuneration and measures of organisational performance.
Results indicate that FP was found to be weakly and inversely 
correlated to ROE during the research study period between 
2006 and 2012 (Raverage = -0.1570) (Bebchuk et al., 2010). The 
inverse relationship between FP and MVA was found to be 
weak to moderate (Raverage = -0.2631) (Bebchuk et al., 2010). 
The relationship between FP and EVA was found to be 
weak to moderate, and inverse in some years (R2006 = -0.2224, 
R2008 = -0.0332, R2009 = -0.2922 and R2010 = -0.0208) whilst direct 
in other years (R2007 = 0.0104, R2011 = 0.3445 and R2012 = 0.0457). 
Both direct relationships between MC and EPS with FP 
were found to be moderate to strong (RMCaverage = 0.7875 and 
REPSaverage = 0.6838).
Results indicate that STIs had an inverse relationship with 
ROE and the strength of the relationship was weak to 
moderate (Raverage = -0.1656). A similar relationship, in terms 
of direction and strength, was observed between STIs and 
MVA and the relationship was inverse and weak to moderate 
(Raverage = 0.2253). The relationship between STIs and EVA 
was found to be generally weak, and direct in some years 
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FIGURE 10: Means and medians correlation coefficients (R) differences.
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(R2006 = 0.1165, R2007 = 0.0704, R2008 = 0.1925 and R2011 = 0.0505) 
whilst inverse in other years (R2009 = -0.1660, R2010 = -0.0704 
and R2012 = -0.2598). Both direct relationships between MC 
and EPS with STIs were found to be weak to moderate 
(RMCaverage = 0.3342 and REPSaverage = 0.3202).
The most stable of the findings was the direct relationship of 
CEO total remuneration with MC and EPS; another was the 
inverse relationship with ROE and MVA.
The findings of the relationship between CEO total 
remuneration and ROE support those found by Van 
Blerck (2012) and, more importantly, the behaviour of the 
relationship during and immediately after financial crisis 
was similar to what Van Blerck found in 2007 in the South 
African financial services sector.
MVA represents value created whilst ROE measures an 
organisation’s profitability by revealing how much profit an 
organisation generates with the money shareholders have 
invested. The inverse relationship found between these 
performance measures and CEO total remuneration is of 
major concern, especially as value creation occurs during 
global financial difficulties when executives adopt a risk-
averse orientation.
The relationship between CEO total remuneration and EVA 
tended to change direction depending on the global economic 
standings. When the global economy was experiencing 
uncertainty or difficulties (e.g. 2008 global financial crisis 
and August 2011 stock market fall), EVA was found to be 
leaning towards being more directly related to CEO total 
remuneration. When the global economy was performing 
well, EVA was found to be leaning towards being more 
inversely related to CEO total remuneration as organisations 
earned more profits and allocated less to the cost of financing 
their respective organisations’ capital.
The correlation findings with regard to EVA suggest that 
CEOs, during economic certainty, engage more in empire 
building, taking investment projects that may not be 
profitable for the shareholder, but are undertaken purely to 
increase the size of the organisation. Similar findings were 
made by Hope and Thomas (2008), who concluded that 
executives grow organisations due to the fact that boards 
have limited information on which to judge their ability, 
and so growth in organisation size seems to be the next best 
solution in ensuring that executives are viewed favourably.
The average FP had a direct relationship with MC and EVA over 
the 7-year research period and the relationships were found 
to be strong and moderate. Results also indicate that average 
FP was inversely correlated to EPS, ROE and MVA and the 
respective relationships were moderate, strong and moderate.
Except for EVA, the relationship between STIs and all 
organisation financial performance measures were directly 
opposite to those found for FP. STIs were found to be 
moderately inversely related to MC and directly related to 
the other four organisation financial performance measures. 
The relative relationship strengths of STIs with the EPS, ROE, 
EVA and MVA were found to be weak, strong, moderate and 
strong.
Shaw and Zhang (2010) point out that efficient remuneration 
contracts will link executive remuneration with organisation 
performance, whilst providing strong incentives for 
executives to operate in shareholders’ best interests. The 
findings of this research, with regard to the directions 
and strengths of the relationships between CEO FP and 
organisation performance measures, suggest that the general 
pay-performance link has been lost. The directions and 
strengths of the relationships between STIs and organisation 
financial performance measures indicate that a link exists 
between what executives receive as STIs and accounting-
based measures of performance.
The irony is that whilst the STI link with organisation financial 
performance measures (i.e. accounting-based measures) exists, 
the FP link with organisation performance measures continues 
to be eroded. Executives are avoiding STIs and paying greater 
attention to FP to reduce the impact of performance-related 
elements in determining their remuneration.
The above findings strongly suggest that failure to reward 
or punish executives for either superior or poor performance 
will continue to erode the link between CEO total 
remuneration and financial organisation performance. The 
optimal contracting approach does not appear to be working 
and the managerial power approach seems dominant, that 
is executive remuneration is not being used as a potential 
instrument for addressing agency problems, but has become 
part of the agency problem itself (Frydman & Jenter, 2010).
The long-term impact of this, according to Jensen and Murphy 
(1999), Anderson and Kleiner (2003) and Haynes et al. (2007), 
will be entrenched bureaucratic remuneration systems in 
which boards become reluctant to either reward CEOs for 
superior performance or punish them for poor performance.
Practical implications
This research suggests that a stronger test of the pay-
performance link and the power of incentive design is 
required in order to ensure that executives are rewarded or 
punished for performance. The question on how executives 
are paid also needs to be considered. The research identifies 
the need for a robust and valid CEO pay-performance 
model to ensure consistency with the agency notion that top 
executives are rewarded for increases in shareholder wealth.
It is suggested that boards and remuneration committees 
need to pay more attention to the different performance 
measures available in assessing CEO performance. More 
attention should also be paid to reducing the subversive 
behaviour of CEOs, which serves to reduce the efficacy of 
the Companies Act (2008) and King III (2009) by avoiding the 
issue of CEOs being measured for performance.
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Research limitations
This research only investigated the specific relationship 
between performance and pay and did not include information 
on the causal factors influencing CEO remuneration and the 
financial performance of the organisations. In addition, the 
size of the organisations studied, and the possible effect that 
this would have on the total remuneration of the CEO, was 
deemed to be beyond the scope of this research. The fact that 
all the organisations selected were large organisations could 
address the problem of organisation size as a threat to the 
validity of the research; however, it is suggested that further 
research should be conducted to see if the same findings 
apply to small and medium organisations.
Conclusion
In theory, efficient remuneration contracts will be 
designed well enough to link executive remuneration with 
organisation performance and provide strong incentives 
for executives to operate organisations in the best interest 
of the shareholders. Additionally, the Companies Act 
(2008) and King III (2009) specify that there should be a 
positive correlation between executive remuneration and 
organisation performance. The primary objective of this 
research was to take advantage of the available information 
on CEO remuneration data and requirements in terms 
of positive correlation between CEO remuneration and 
financial performance of organisations.
Based on the findings of the current research, it can 
be concluded that there have been structural changes 
after the 2008 global financial crisis with regard to total 
remuneration received by CEOs; these structural changes 
were further amplified after the August 2011 stock market 
fall. The findings of the current research indicate that 
these changes were deliberate as CEO were focusing 
more on fixed pay and moving away from performance-
related short-term incentives, thus creating a disconnect 
between what CEOs are being paid and the performance 
of organisations.
More attention needs to be paid to the different behaviours 
of top executives, especially CEOs, in making the Companies 
Act (2008) and King III (2009) requirements ineffective as 
they avoid being measured on the performance of their 
organisations.
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